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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellant,
vs.

:

Case No. 990470-CA

:
Priority No. 2

DANIEL CRUZ PEREZ,
Defendant/Appellee.

:
:

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT

In addition to the facts and arguments contained in the State's opening brief, the
State submits the following points in reply to the statements and arguments contained in
defendant's responsive brief.
THE STATUTORY PHRASE "OTHERWISE DAMAGES" IS NOT
AMBIGUOUS, AND INCLUDES DEFENDANT'S ACTIONS AS
ALLEGED
In his brief, defendant does not dispute that the State produced evidence at the
preliminary hearing that he caused damage to a jail by scratching an obscenity into a
cell dooi

1 >cfenilant aipues only that the damaging jails statute, Utah Code Ann. § 76-

8-418 (1999), must be narrowly construed to apply only to damage which meets some
unspecified degree of seriousness.

The statute punishes anyone who "breaks down, pulls down, destroys, floods, or
otherwise damages" a jail. In order to argue that the statute does not apply to his
actions, defendant must show that the phrase "otherwise damages" is so inherently
ambiguous that the court must consider the other acts listed in the statute in order to
determine its meaning. This argument fails for several reasons.
First, this Court has already rejected it. In State v. Pharris, 846 P.2d 454 (Utah
App. 1993), the court held that the damaging jails statute is unambiguous and broadly
prohibits all physical damage of whatever degree. "The statute sets the standard that
any injury to a physical facility used for jail functions can be punished under the
statute." Id. at 466. The amendment of the statute from the phrase "otherwise
destroys or injures" in the former statute to the current phrase, "otherwise damages"
only serves to make the broad scope of the statute more clear.
Second, defendant's argument is based on a false comparison to sex crimes. In
support of his ambiguity argument, defendant compares the language of this statute to
the inherently ambiguous terms used to describe sex offenses. Brief of Appellee, p. 56. Defendant asserts that the phrase "otherwise damages" in § 76-8-418 is comparable
to the term "otherwise takes indecent liberties," in § 76-5-404 (1999), as discussed by
the court in State ex rel J.L.S., 610 P.2d 1294 (Utah 1980). In fact, these phrases are
in no way comparable. As defendant acknowledges in his brief, the phrase "otherwise
damages" is a "broad-yet plain" term. Brief of Appellee, p. 5. On the other hand, the
2

phrase "indecent liberties" is necessarily vague, a difficulty arising out of the special
problems inherent in drafting statutes prohibiting sexual abuse:
These questions are, in a basic sense, manifestations of a recurring
problem in construing statutes, particularly those prohibiting sex crimes:
On the one hand, there is the need to give effect to the legislative intent
and penalize sexual abuse, a concept which, in all its possible forms, is
extremely difficult to define. On the other hand, there is a need to define
the prohibited conduct with precision in order to avoid unconstitutional
vagueness and chilling of protected conduct, and to avoid attaching the
weight of criminal culpability to innocent or innocuous (but possibly
indecorous) behavior.
Utah courts have addressed this problem by interpreting the broad,
catch-all phrases of sex crime statutes (phrases such as "taking indecent
liberties") in light of all of the facts and circumstances of the case.
State v. Peters, 796 P.2d 708, 711 (Utah App. 1990). In State ex rel J.L.S., the court
found that the phrase "indecent liberties" is so inherently ambiguous that the statute
would be void-for-vagueness unless it is given meaning and limited in scope by the
more specific acts listed. Id., 610 P.2d at 1296. See also State v. Vogt, 824 P.2d 455,
458 (Utah App. 1991) ("'the phrase "act of gross lewdness" is not subject to a plain
meaning, but must derive its definition from the context in which it occurs.'") {quoting
State v. Serpente, 768 P.2d 994 (Utah App. 1989)).
In this case, defendant has not asserted that the scope of the phrase "otherwise
damages" must be limited in order to prevent the statute from being unconstitutionally
vague, and a void-for-vagueness argument against the damaging jails statute was
explicitly rejected without any need for limiting its broad scope. Pharris, 846 P.2d at

3

466 ("Defendant's disagreement with the broad interpretation of the statue's language
does not translate to a lack of meaningful standards to guide the application of the
statute."). Accordingly, unlike cases interpreting language used to describe sex crimes,
there is no need for the court to turn to interpretive doctrines such as eusdem generis or
noscitur a sociis in order to avoid a vagueness problem in this statute. See Id. ("the
statutory language includes 'any damage to the facility' within the plain meaning of
'injury'").
Finally, defendant acknowledges that this court has adopted a broad definition of
"injury" or "damage" in interpreting this statute. In the face of this, defendant asserts
only that the court should must determine on a case-by-case basis whether the statute
applies to the alleged conduct. Brief of Appellee, p. 7-8. Of course, the application of
any statute to alleged conduct is determined on a case-by-case basis, in that the facts
proven at the preliminary hearing are examined by the court to determine whether they
fulfill all of the elements of the crime alleged.
In this case, however, defendant is seeking to add an additional element to the
crime, i.e., that the damage done to the jail meets some unspecified level of
"substantial" injury or caused some unspecified level of harm to the operation of the
jail.1 The broad and unambiguous language of the statute precludes the imposition of

1

Defendant's formulation of the additional element is even more limited than
this, and would not justify dismissal of the charges against him in this case. Defendant
4

such a requirement, and the courts in Pharris and State v. Jaimez, 817 P.2d 822 (Utah
App. 1991), did not require proof of some substantial level of damage. See Pharris,
846 P.2d at 466 (rejection of defendant's argument that "the statute should be limited to
felony prosecution of 'substantial' damage").
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, the trial court's quashal of the bindover and dismissal of
the charge should be reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this _W_ day of February, 2000.
JAN GRAHAM
Attorney General

SCOTT KEITH WILSON
Assistant Attorney General

asserts that the statute should be construed to require that the State prove that the
alleged conduct "damages or injures portions of the jail facility that are essential to its
proper functioning and legislative purpose." Brief of Appellee, p. 8. The cell door
which defendant damaged is obviously essential to the functioning of a jail.
5
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